06

Outlook & scenarios

educated guesses · 2026–2030

Where might Africa's external security engagement head next? Below are three illustrative scenarios — educated guesses extrapolated from the observed 2000–2025 record, holding other factors constant (ceteris paribus). They are interpretive judgements, not predictions. Select a scenario to re-run the projection, the indicators and the table.

Who's rising, who's falling

Change in supplier-bloc share of African deliveries, 2015–19 → 2020–25 (percentage points) — observed; the same under every scenario

The order book: ordered vs delivered

Continental TIV of orders placed vs deliveries made, by era — orders lead deliveries: the 2005–14 order surge became the 2015–19 delivery peak, and the cooler 2020s order book points to thinner deliveries ahead · observed; the same under every scenario

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Choose a scenario

select one — the projection updates ↓
Baseline · most likely

Multipolar diversification

No hegemon. With Russia's delivered share collapsing (41.6% → 15.1% in 2020–25) and capacity strained by its war, African buyers keep spreading procurement across European suppliers (EU-other now ~29%), China, Türkiye and the Gulf.

Drivers
  • Russia's export capacity diverted to Ukraine
  • Drone diplomacy — Türkiye 0% → 4.2% in one era
  • Buyers hedging against single-supplier dependence
Watch for first-time Turkish/Chinese/Gulf deals, new defence-cooperation pacts, continued EU-other share.
Stress · upside-volume risk

Conflict-driven demand rebound

Continental deliveries have fallen from the 2016 peak (5,387 TIV) to ~1,450 in 2025. Escalating Sahel and Horn instability — and the Sudan war — could reverse that decline, pulling in whichever suppliers will sell, often the embargo-tolerant.

Drivers
  • The coup belt and jihadist insurgencies
  • The SAF–RSF war and its spillovers
  • Weak embargo enforcement
Watch for rising ACLED fatalities, transfers to embargoed states, surging small-arms and drone imports.
Swing factor

Western recommitment

France slipped from its 2015–19 peak (18.1% → 16.5%) amid Sahel withdrawals; the US holds near 13%. In this branch the West re-engages through security partnerships and arms ties, clawing back share from Russia's security-services model and from China.

Drivers
  • Great-power competition and counter-terrorism
  • Migration politics and base access
  • African states' own non-alignment
Watch for French/US force posture, new vs. cancelled agreements, Chinese basing beyond Djibouti.

Projected supplier mix

Bloc share by era — solid is observed; the dashed leg is the selected scenario's extrapolation to 2026–30 · not a forecast

Projected shares, 2026–30

Each bloc's projected share vs its 2020–25 actual — updates with the selected scenario

Supplier bloc2020–252026–30Δ pp

⚠ Interpretation, not data. This page is the only forward-looking part of the Observatory. The scenarios apply transparent, stated tilts to a dampened extrapolation of observed momentum, renormalised to 100% — analytical judgements under a ceteris paribus assumption, not forecasts. Real trajectories will be shaped by shocks the data cannot anticipate. Every other section reports observed, sourced figures only.